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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK ANTHONY MERLEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
) CASE NO. 20000589-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2) (e) (1999) . 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions 
are relevant to this case, and their text is set forth in Addendum 
A: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1; Did the district court err in denying Merlen's 
motion to suppress, where the police officer detained Merlen 
without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The factual findings underlying a trial 
court's denial of a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 
(Utah.Ct.App. 1996). The trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 22, 2000, Mark Anthony Merlen was charged by 
information with one count of Unlawful Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2); one count of Unlawful Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2); one count of Possession of 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37a-5. Merlen moved to suppress all of the evidence 
which was obtained during his detention and arrest based on Fourth 
Amendment violations which occurred during Merlenfs initial 
detention. On May 26, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held on 
Merlen's motion. At the end of the hearing, Judge Halliday denied 
Merlen's motion to suppress. On June 2, 2000, Merlen entered a 
guilty plea to Amended Count I of the Information, Unlawful 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2), and reserved his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On that same 
day, he was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 25, 1999, Price City Officer Tracy Allred was on 
routine patrol. (R. 51 at 8:18:22). Shortly after midnight, Officer 
Allred was patrolling the area around the north ballpark and the 
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horse corrals. (R. 51 at 9:3-6). In that particular area, there had 
been incidents of criminal mischief and teenagers smoking marijuana 
and drinking beer. (R. 51 at 9:6-8). 
As Officer Allred came to the north end of the road toward the 
ballpark complex, he noticed a truck in the main parking lot on the 
east side of the complex. (R. 51 at 9:14-16). Officer Allred drove 
past without stopping, and went around to check the west end of the 
complex. (R. 51 at 9:16:17). As Officer Allred was coming back 
past the east end, he noticed that the truck was still there. (R. 
51 at 9:17-18). There was no other traffic in the area at that 
time. (R. 51 at 9:19-24). 
Officer Allred initially testified that he became suspicious 
of the truck because of his past experience with juveniles drinking 
and smoking marijuana in that area, and also because of that fact 
that suicides often occur during the holiday season. (R. 51 at 
10:2-10). Later, the officer conceded that he never asked Merlen 
any questions, or made any inquiry, regarding Merlen's mental or 
emotional state. (R. 51 at 20:1-4). 
Officer Allred testified that he approached the truck in his 
vehicle, and stopped in front of the truck, so that his patrol car 
was facing the front of the truck at about a 45 degree angle. (R. 
51 at 10:1-14). Officer Allred testified that his patrol car did 
not block the truck in, and that it would have been possible for 
the truck to drive away. (R. 51 at 10:15-18). But he conceded the 
rear end of Merlen's truck was up against a curb or hill, and that 
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he parked in front of the truck so that the right front of the 
patrol car was at the right front of Merlen' s truck. (R. 51 at 
20:16-20). 
Officer Allred testified that he noticed that the truck had 
California license plates, and realized that he had seen the same 
truck a few days earlier. (R. 51 at 10:20-23). Officer Allred 
remembered from seeing the truck earlier that the registration on 
the truck had expired in 1997. (R. 51 at 10:20-23). Officer Allred 
testified that as he sat in his patrol car, he called into dispatch 
with a description of the truck and the license plate number. (R. 
51 at 10:25, 11:1-2). 
As Officer Allred was calling the information into dispatch, 
he noticed that a male, who turned out to be Mark Merlen, was 
sitting in the truck on the passenger side of the vehicle. (R. 51 
at 11:1-3) . Officer Allred testified that he could Merlen making 
"a lot of movement with his hands as if he was putting something 
down in front of his pants or down his pants. (R. 51 at 11:2-5). 
No one else was in the vehicle. (R. 51 at 11:6-7). 
Officer Allred got out of his patrol vehicle and approached 
the truck on foot. (R. 51 at 11:15-19). Officer Allred had the 
"take down" lights of his patrol car directed at Merlen's vehicle 
as he approached the truck. (R. 51 at 22:1-4). Officer Allred 
walked around the side of the truck, and saw empty beer cartons in 
the back of the truck. (R. 51 at 11:15-19). Officer Allred 
initially testified that the window was rolled down before he 
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approached, (R. 51 at 11:20-23), but later conceded that Merlen may 
have rolled the window down after the officer approached that side 
of the vehicle. (R. 51 at 19:6-15). The officer approached Merlenf s 
window and asked him "what was going on." (R. 51 at 11:18-19). 
Officer Allred testified that Merlen said that he was just relaxing 
there in his truck. (R. 51 at 12:4-5). Officer Allred asked Merlen 
if he'd been drinking, and Merlen said no. (R. 51 at 12:5-6). 
Officer Allred testified that he did not smell alcohol or observe 
any sign that Merlen was impaired. (R. 51 at 12:4-9). 
After verifying that Merlen had not been drinking and was not 
depressed or suicidal, Officer Allred asked Merlen to shut off the 
engine of his vehicle. (R. 51 at 12:9-11, 23:20-25, 24:1-8). When 
he asked Merlen to turn off his vehicle, Officer Allred could not 
identify any particular criminal activity that Merlen had engaged 
in or was about to engage in. (R. 51 at 22:16-20). However, Officer 
Allred asked Merlen to turn the engine off because he wanted to 
talk to Merlen some more (R. 51 at 12:8-11), and wanted to assure 
that Merlen would not drive away. (R. 51 at 22:8-13, 23:14-19). 
Merlen complied with the officer's request. (R. 51 at 12:12-13). 
After he turned off the engine, the keys remained in the ignition. 
(R. 51 at 12:14-15). 
Officer Allred asked Merlen why he was moving around as if he 
was trying to hide something, and Merlen answered that he was 
simply zipping his pants up. (R. 51 at 12:17-19). Officer Allred 
then explained to Merlen that he was talking to him because "it was 
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suspicious for him to be out here in the middle . . . of nowhere at 
1:00 in the morning ." (R. 51 at 12:19-22). At that point, Officer 
Allred asked Merlen for his driver's license. (R. 51 at 12:20-
23) . 
Merlen provided his driver's license, as requested. (R. 51 at 
12:24-25). Officer Allred continued talking with Merlen. Merlen 
admitted that the registration was expired, but informed the 
officer that he had purchased a temporary registration sticker. (R. 
51 at 13:6-8). Officer Allred testified that he went around the 
back of the vehicle to look at the registration sticker, but 
couldn't find an expiration date on the temporary sticker, because 
it was too faded. (R. 51 at 13:8-10). Officer Allred testified 
that he never went to check the registration until after he had 
asked Merlen to turn the truck's engine off. (R. 51 at 22:4-13). 
At that point, Officer Allred returned to his patrol car to 
run a statewide and local warrants check on Merlen. (R. 51 at 
13:15-16). Before dispatch got back to Officer Allred, Merlen 
informed the officer that he had a $500.00 warrant out of Draper. 
(R. 13:18-21). After verifying that Merlen did have a warrant, 
Officer Allred told Merlen to step out of the truck. (R. 51 at 
14:10-13). Officer Allred handcuffed Merlen and placed him the 
patrol car. (R. 51 at 14:10-15). During a search subsequent to 
Merlen's arrest, a small quantity of controlled substances was 
found on Merlen's person. (R. 51 at 15:7-11), ultimately leading to 
his conviction in the instant case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officer continued to detain Merlen after his initial 
suspicions were dispelled, without reasonable suspicion, and in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Merlen's arrest warrant was 
discovered during the period in which Merlen was unlawfully seized, 
and the evidence found during the search subsequent to arrest, and 
was therefore fruit of the unlawful seizure and should have been 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I• The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Merlen's Motion to 
Suppress Where the Officer Continued to Detain Merlen 
After His Initial Suspicions Were Dispelled. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. See e.g. United States v. Stone/ 866 F.2d 359, 362 
(10th Cir. 1989). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 
88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), a law enforcement officer may stop and 
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes "if the officer 
has a reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity may be 
afoot." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). The reasonableness of an investigative 
detention is a dual inquiry: (1) "whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception," and (2) whether the officer's action 
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that first 
justified the interference." United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 
1141 (10th Cir. 1998)(quotation omitted); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 
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20. However, "[a]n officer may approach a citizen at any time and 
pose questions [without reasonable suspicion or probable cause] as 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will. State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah.Ct .App. 1989) (quoting State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)). 
In the instant case, as set forth below, the encounter between 
Merlen and the police officer was not consensual encounter. 
Additionally, while there may have been reasonable suspicion to 
justify the initial stop, the officer unlawfully exceeded the scope 
of the stop when they detained Merlen after the initial 
justification had dissipated, without reasonable suspicion for 
doing so. 
A. The Initial Stop Was Not a Consensual Encounter 
A police-citizen encounter is not consensual if, "in view of 
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed he was not free to leave." United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
In the instant case, the encounter between Merlen and Officer 
Allred took place very late at night in a very isolated location. 
The officer acknowledged that he parked his patrol car in such a 
manner that the right front of his car was near the left front of 
Merlen's truck. (R. 51 at 20:16-20). In other words the vehicles 
were nose-to-nose, but the officer's patrol car was parked at an 
angle to Merlen's truck. The officer acknowledged that Merlen's 
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truck was backed up against a curb or hill. (R. 51 at 20:16-20). 
The officer activated his "take down" lights before exiting his 
patrol car, and approached the window on the passenger side where 
Merlen was sitting. (R. 51 at 11:15-19, 22:1-4). After asking a few 
questions, the officer asked Merlen to turn off the engine to the 
vehicle. (R. 51 at 22:16-20). He testified he did so for the 
purpose of making sure that Merlen didn't drive away while he was 
talking to him. (R. 51 at 22:16-20). 
It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person in Merlen's 
position would have felt free to ignore the officer's questions and 
drive away. In fact, the circumstances in this case are nearly 
identical to those in State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah.Ct .App. 
1997), wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that the stop was not 
consensual, and was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
In Struhs, a sheriff's deputy saw the defendant driving 
towards a construction site at about 10:00 p.m. Struhs at 1226. 
The defendant turned his truck around at the end of the road 
leading to the construction site, and backed up against some 
barricades and a sign that said "Road Closed." Id. The deputy 
parked her vehicle directly in front of the defendant's car, nose 
to nose, but about one-and-a-half car lengths in front of the 
defendant's car. Id. The officer activated her headlights and her 
takedown lights, and approached the defendant's vehicle on foot. 
Od. The Struhs court held that a reasonable person would not have 
felt free to leave because of the late hour, the isolated location, 
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the activation of the takedown lights, and the parking nose-to-nose 
with the defendant's vehicle.1 Id. at 1228. The court rejected the 
State's argument that, because the defendant's vehicle was not 
completely blocked in by the patrol car, the defendant was not 
detained for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. 
In the instant case, along with nearly all of the factors 
present in Struhs, there are two additional factors that make it 
clear that this was not a consensual encounter. First, it is clear 
from the record that Merlen's car was very nearly blocked in by the 
officer's patrol car. The officer acknowledged that Merlen's truck 
was backed right up to the edge of a hill or curb. (R. 51 at 20:8-
15) . The officer also testified that he parked his patrol car with 
"the right front of my car being to the right front of his car." 
(R. 51 at 20:16-20). While the officer testified that Merlen's car 
was not completely blocked in (R. 51 at 10:15-18), his path was 
clearly blocked to a significant degree, and had he wished to drive 
away, he would have had to maneuver his way around the police car 
in order to do so. 
Additionally, and more importantly, the officer went beyond 
activating the takedown lights and parking nose-to-nose, and 
actually asked Merlen to turn off the engine of his vehicle. The 
:The Struhs court also referred to "the confrontational 
approach made by the officer," but did not cite any facts 
supporting a confrontation approach except that the deputy had 
pulled up to the defendant with no lights on, and then suddenly 
activated her high beams and takedown light. Struhs at 1228. 
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officer testified that he did so because he "wanted to talk to 
[Merlen] more" and "didn't want him drivin' off." (R. 51 at 22:8-
15) . It is simply inconceivable that any citizen would feel free 
to simply drive away with a police officer standing outside your 
car window asking you to turn your engine off - and to imply that 
it would be lawful to do so is to place both citizens and police 
officers in a very vulnerable position during such encounters. 
Accordingly, it is clear that Merlen was detained from the 
moment the officer approached his car window and began questioning 
him. But assuming for argument's sake that the initial seconds of 
the encounter were consensual, the stop was certainly converted to 
an investigative detention once the officer asked Merlen to turn 
his engine off, which Merlen himself had not done voluntarily. 
II. The Officer Exceeded the Scope of The Lawful Encounter 
When He Detained Merlen For Questioning After Dispelling 
His Initial Suspicions. 
The officer exceeded the lawful scope of the encounter 
(whether it was merely consensual or an investigative detention 
supported by reasonable suspicion) when he asked Merlen to shut off 
the engine of his vehicle, and thereby converted the encounter into 
a seizure which was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Assuming that there was reasonable suspicion for the officer's 
initial encounter with Merlen, "[a]n investigative detention must 
*last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.'" United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 
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1999) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 
229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). It must be temporary, and its scope 
must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. United 
States v. Gutierrez-Daniez, 131 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1997), 
cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1035 (1998); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 
942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997) . Once the initial justification for the 
stop is satisfied, the officer must allow the driver to proceed 
without further delay or additional questioning. United States v. 
Patten, 183 F.3d at 1193; United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 
1064 (10th Cir. 1997) . 
A longer detention for additional questioning "must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity 
. . . based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality 
of the circumstances." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1998). See also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 
1349. Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches, however, do 
not provide reasonable suspicion. United States v. Fernandez, 18 
F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994). 
In the instant case, Officer Allred testified that he 
initially approached Merlen because of his suspicions about drug 
and alcohol abuse, and his concerns about suicide or depression. 
However, the officer testified that just seconds after he 
approached Merlen, he confirmed that Merlen was not suicidal or 
depressed, and was not impaired by beer or drugs. The officer 
asked Merlen about the hand movement he had observed, and Merlen 
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explained that he had been zipping up his pants. (R. 51 at 12:17-
19). In fact, Officer Allred himself testified that when he asked 
Merlen to shut off his engine, his initial suspicions had been 
dispelled (R. 51 at 23:20-25, 24:1-8), and he did not have any 
suspicion of any additional criminal activity. (R. 51 at 22:16-19). 
It should be noted that the State bears the initial burden for 
establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop, State v. 
Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994); thus, since the officer 
himself testified that he did not have specific suspicions of 
criminal activity when he asked Merlen to shut down the engine, the 
State clearly failed to meet its burden. 
The possibility that the vehicle registration may have been 
expired should not influence the reasonable suspicion calculation 
for several reasons. First, the officer did not testify that 
suspicion about expired registration was the basis for the 
continued detention. (R. 51 at 22:16-19). Secondly, the officer did 
not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the plates were 
expired on the night in question merely because he had seen the 
truck with expired plates on a previous occasion. Clearly, the 
mere fact that a vehicle had expired plates at some time in the 
past, without more, does not provide an ongoing justification for 
stopping the vehicle or detaining its occupants. Thirdly, if the 
officer developed reasonable suspicion in that regard (by looking 
at the temporary sticker or questioning Merlen about the 
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registration), it was after the officer unlawfully detained Merlen 
by asking him to turn the engine of his truck off. (R. 51 at 23:9-
13, 12:4-11, 13:4-10) . 
As mentioned above, an investigative stop "must last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Royer, 
460 U.S. 500 (emphasis added). In United States v. Sandoval, 29 
F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit makes it abundantly 
clear that a detention which is prolonged even a minute or two 
beyond its legal justification is a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. In Sandoval, a police officer directed the defendant to 
sit in the police car with the officer. After completing the 
traffic citation which was the original justification for the stop, 
the officer detained the defendant a minute longer to ask questions 
about weapons and drugs. Id. at 541-542. After determining that the 
detention had not been rendered a consensual encounter by the 
return of the defendant's documents, the court held that the 
officer exceeded the authorized scope of the stop, and rendered the 
detention unlawful and the consent to search involuntary — even 
though the stop was prolonged by a just a minute or two before the 
consent was obtained. Id. at 541-542. 
In the instant case, the officer continued to detain Merlen 
for several minutes after any lawful justification for the stop had 
dissipated. The officer testified that he did not suspect any 
particular activity, but simply wanted to talk to Merlen some more. 
It was during these minutes, when Merlen was unlawfully detained, 
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that the officer asked Merlen for his driver's license and 
determined to run a warrants check on Merlen. 
III. Merlen7s Arrest and Subsequent Search Were the Fruit of 
His Illegal Detention. 
All of the evidence discovered subsequent to Merlen's arrest 
was the fruit of his unlawful detention and thus should have been 
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be 
used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This includes "the 
'fruit" of such illegal conduct. Wong Sun v. U.S. , 371 U.S. 471 
(1963) . Although Merlen volunteered the information about his 
outstanding arrest warrant, he did so after he was unlawfully 
detained and after the officer was in the process of running a 
warrants check. Thus, the evidence obtained after his arrest was 
clearly the "fruit" of his unlawful arrest, and should have been 
suppressed, 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Merlen respectfully asserts that the 
trial court erred when it denied his Motion to Suppress, and 
requests that his convicted be vacated on that basis. 
DATED this \Z> day of July, 2/ 
L^LRED 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
UT ST § 58-37-8 
58-37-8 Prohibited acts -Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which 
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more 
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance 
analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was 
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during 
the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
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than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including 
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third 
or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C -Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
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manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any 
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D —Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties 
and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony 
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that 
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would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a 
first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, 
and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted 
under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty 
prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly 
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in 
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as 
described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the 
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did 
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by 
an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, § 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 
1985, ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 
95, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, 
ch. 201, § 1; 1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 
1991, ch. 198, § 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 
6; 1998, ch. 139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1. 
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